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diosyncratic stock volatility refers to the variation in
returns to an individual company’s stock that is not
explained by the overall market return. Given returns
in a quarter, for example, we can run a regression of one
company’s daily returns on daily market returns and use
the standard deviation of the residuals as a measure of
the idiosyncratic volatility of that company’s stock in that
quarter. To obtain an aggregate measure, we calculate the
idiosyncratic volatility for each of 500 stocks with the
largest market capitalization using the CRSP (Center for
Research of Security Prices) daily returns data and then
calculate an average weighted by market value.
In the accompanying chart, we plot this aggregate
measure of idiosyncratic volatility for the period 1963:Q3
to 2002:Q4, with the shaded areas indicating business
recessions dated by the National Bureau of Economic
Research. We observe some interesting patterns. First,
idiosyncratic volatility exhibits some persistence: If it is
high, it is likely to remain at a relatively high level for a
while. Second, idiosyncratic volatility fluctuates widely
across time and it tends to rise especially during business
recessions. It also has a dramatic upward spike during the
stock market bubble in the late 1990s. Third, and most
interestingly, as noted by many financial market observers,
idiosyncratic volatility has increased on average in the
past four decades: A linear time trend accounts for
about 24 percent of its total variation.
According to standard finance theory, a
firm’s stock price is equal to its discounted
expected future cash flows. Therefore, rising
idiosyncratic volatility might reflect the fact
that the firm-level economic performance has
become more volatile. To investigate this
hypothesis, some researchers have looked at
firm-level variability in sales and earnings
growth and have found upward trends in these
measures as well. The increase in firm-level
variability is in sharp contrast with the well-
documented decline in the variability of the
aggregate U.S. economy. Some tentative expla-
nations have been put forward to reconcile
the diverging trends in macroeconomic and firm-level
volatilities. For example, Philippon (2003) suggests that
the two phenomena can be explained simultaneously by the
fact that goods markets have become more competitive.1
Competition between firms magnifies the effects of idio-
syncratic productivity shocks, which helps explain the rise
in firm volatility.  At the same time, competitive pressures
could induce firms to increase the frequency of their price
adjustment, making the overall economy more resilient to
aggregate demand shocks.
The increased firm-level volatility has important impli-
cations for the U.S. economy. For example, with a higher
degree of idiosyncratic volatility, a typical firm is presum-
ably more vulnerable to bankruptcy risk and thus needs to
pay a higher default premium to raise capital in the bond
market. Indeed, Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that
spreads between corporate and Treasury bond yields tend
to widen during periods of higher idiosyncratic risk in the
period between 1963 and 1999.2 This explanation is par-
ticularly relevant for the bond market in the late 1990s,
when yield spreads widened substantially, despite the fact
that investors were quite optimistic about the overall
performance of the U.S. economy. This episode is less
puzzling, however, if we take into account the dramatic
increase in idiosyncratic volatility during this period.
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